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complex reality; but, selection of, and concentration on, one element of a com* 
plicated whole is also recognized in the historical process (especially in HOnen 
and Nichiren).
In presenting simplicity as the distinctive quality o f Japanese spirituality, 
Brinkman himself exhibits an intuitive grasp o f Japanese reality as a whole—a 
grasp that is not available as long as one stays too close to the concrete details 
o f one’s field o f specialization. The author makes a rather convincing case for 
his paradigm, which should be received, at the least, as a possibly fruitful 
working hypothesis, to be further tested by the specialists in the different 
fields. In conclusion, a pious wish: although the book is more than worth read­
ing as it is, I dare hope that the book will soon appear in a thoroughly revised 
and emended form.
Hybrid Theology (A Response)
John P. Keenan
Joseph O’Leary has lived in Japan for a dozen or more years now. He is well 
aware o f Buddhist traditions and their potential impact upon western theologi­
cal endeavors. I appreciate his article, “The Significance o f John Keenan’s 
Mahayana Theology” (The Eastern Buddhist, XXX, 1 [1997]: 114-32), even 
though he objects that my “ commentary is a perpetual hybridization o f two 
heterogeneous worlds (128).“  I would grant the hybrid nature o f a Mahayana 
theology, but I would argue that a hybrid is perhaps better suited to withstand 
the frost o f the modern world. For we do live in a single world with no privi­
leged realms o f protected theological meanings. That sometime Vermonter 
Rudyard Kipling proclaimed of east and west that “ Never the ‘twain shall 
meet.” This dictum, however, merely reflected his own narrow cultural view­
point. (Perhaps he tarried too briefly among us here in Vermont.)
O’Leary is well aware that the house o f Christian theology is tottering and, 
he implies, ablaze. Fire often does accompany earthquake. And so he speaks 
o f the Mahayana net o f emptiness rescuing people from the earthquake­
damaged edifice o f Christianity. I do believe that the cultural structure o f Chris­
tendom has been shaken and is tottering—right and left—so that many 
engage in nostalgic attempts to regain a lost center. But I do not imagine Chris­
tianity as gone up in flames, in imminent danger o f being consumed in the fire 
of postmodern malaise. And so I cannot agree with O’Leary that ‘‘Mahayana 
Buddhism has become structurally necessary to Christian faith.” Nor do I
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think that the “ thought-world of Hellenistic metaphysics . . . has now been 
exhausted”  (115). I would argue, however, that, despite the honored place 
in Christian doctrinal history held by Hellenistic metaphysics, it must not be 
allowed to crowd out all other approaches. I would argue that Mah&yfina 
philosophy as well can play the role of ancilia theologiae, a handmaid in 
service of theology. Theology, that revered queen of the medieval sciences, 
can in fact have many different handmaids. A Mahayana approach is just one 
approach to use in exfoliating the kerygma, especially beautiful in that its 
wisdom focus directs our attention back to the indigenous Christian mystic 
tradition of holy skepticism. 1 believe, then, that there is no “ necessity of ap­
plying these [Buddhist] ideas to Christian tradition” (115), but that there is 
much profit in the endeavor, for Mahayana thought “ can assist Christian 
theology both in reclaiming the centrality of its own mystic tradition and in 
maintaining a valid place for theoretical systematics”  (119). If the house of 
Christianity is indeed tottering from earthquake, the best course of action is 
not to jump out the window, but rather calmly and deliberately to make our 
way down its shaking stairs to seek the relative safety of the out-of-doors.
Ancient Frameworks fo r  Christian Discourse
In partial faithfulness to our western forebears who championed reason over 
blind, unthinking faith, I would further argue that Christian thinkers cannot 
function authentically within the classical confines of past cultural assump­
tions, however metaphysical they be. Still, I would not say that the classical 
debates in christology “ have divorced themselves from such mandatory re­
ference to awakening” (124). In their time and in their culture, classical for­
mulations were existentially crucial to the Christian practice. They were felt in­
tensely and triggered deep emotions. People’s very identities were at issue. 
Such emotive intensity can indeed be recaptured—by the engaged scholar im­
mersed in the texts and histories of our shared western past. I do not think 
that “ the conceptual labors of the Council [of Chalcedon] were tied to the pat­
tern of imaginary reification” (126), but I do think the mere repeating of its 
definitions is largely an unskillful way for the theologian to enunciate the 
meaning of Christ to the present world. My critique is merely that the culture 
of metaphysics is past, available only by dint of long hours of historical study 
and imaginative reclamation. To insist upon that archaic framework for the 
presentation of Christian doctrine is to make unnecessary and unwarranted de­
mands upon the Gospel. Furthermore, it excuses Christian thinkers from the 
very task that defines their activity: the enunciation of the Gospel meaning 
within modern cultures and frameworks. To argue, as 1 do, that all discourse 
is conventional, in no wise itself ultimate, is to say no more about “ traditional
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Christian discourse”  (124) than that, like any discourse, it is dependently co­
arisen.
Nor do I think that there is “ nothing obscure or problematic in these no­
tions [of emptiness, dependent co-arising, and the two truths]”  (115). These 
notions constitute the very central theme of MAdhyamika thought, have 
a long, and at times convoluted, history as they moved from India to China 
and Tibet, are the subject of innumerable scholarly efforts by western and 
Japanese Buddhologists, and still inform the ongoing flow of Buddhist think­
ing. I adopt a Mahayana approach not because its discourse is the dear winner 
in any comparative challenge, but simply because 1 am convinced of the beau­
ty and cogency of that discourse. Such an alien approach provides a different 
set of interlocking insights from which to envisage the tasks of Christian theol­
ogy. Thus, while I think that classical metaphysics are elegant and persuasive 
as long as one is familiar with, and moves within, their context of shared 
metaphysical principles, I argue that other approaches can carry the task into 
other areas of Christian experience, perhaps (and this is my hope) redirecting 
attention to the early and medieval mystic traditions of the Church. Never 
would I deny that Christianity at its best is “ a sophisticated self-critical 
religion”  (116).
The Two Truths
There is, I think, no “ level”  (115) or “ vantage”  (126) of ultimate meaning, 
and so it makes no sense to complain about consigning doctrine to the “ con­
ventional register” (126). The only register we have is conventional. The 
MahAyAna notion of the two truths does not set up a double-decker hierarchy 
of truth, as if ultimate truth were the genuine article, with conventional truth 
the spurious pretender. The doctrine of the two truths is framed differently; it 
is about the language-formed and thus conventional enunciation of truth 
from ultimate silence.
From early on in MahAyAna doctrinal history there was clear and profound 
awareness of the deluding force of language (praparica), the power of words 
to construct mental pictures of reality (abhilapa-vasana), and the penchant of 
the mind to cling to those pictures (klitfa-manas) in the service of a false no­
tion of self (atmagraha). NAgarjuna presents his MAdhyamika corrective by in­
culcating a “ holy skepticism,”  an emptying of the supposed power of lan­
guage to capture the essences of things and exercise control over life itself. All 
language is “ demoted”  from its usurped role of mediating final viewpoints on 
any reality. By this very demotion, however, language is reclaimed as lan­
guage, as a human construct—more or less intelligently deployed, more or less 
rationally employed, more or less skillfully designed.
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I do not think, however, that this renders the truth of ultimate meaning “ ex­
tremely static, silent, monotonous, in comparison with the dynamic, com­
municative, and many-sided God of biblical tradition”  (120). Rather, in 
Mahaydna terms, ultimate meaning is neither static nor dynamic, neither si­
lent nor enunciated, neither monotonous nor many-sided, because ultimate 
truth does not function within our frameworks of meaning or philosophy. It 
calls into question those very frameworks, recommending a skepticism not 
just of metaphysical theology, but of the arrogant claims of reasoned faith it­
self. Theology does have a well-earned reputation for pretense, mistaking its 
conceptual maps for actual realities.
The notion of the truth of ultimate meaning in Mahdy&na is meant, I think, 
to serve as a “ holy skepticism,”  disallowing the putative capturing of 
reality—pulling the thinker back, again and again, to the silence of wonder 
and the givenness of the world. This skepticism does not gruffly dismiss faith 
claims with the arrogance of the existentialist hero, but it does hesitate to 
move so quickly from the questions to the answers. It is content to abide, 
perhaps for a lifetime, in the very act of questioning as itself a true pointer to 
reality, impelling one constantly to sift the scriptures anew, not to counter­
poise a deist notion of a static god to the rich emotive contours of the biblical 
God. Those emotive contours call to mind the writings of Abraham Joshua 
Heschel, who countered sterile, metaphysical notions of the unchanging being 
of God by stressing the emotive, clearly conventional, nature of the biblical 
God (God in Search o f  Man). Like Heschel, one has to read and interpret the 
ancient narratives of scripture as the conventional embodiment of ultimate 
meaning. To deepen such interpretations, however, one should distinguish 
world-constituting myth from world-emptying parable (see John D. Cross an, 
The Dark Interval: Toward a Theology o f  Narrative). One is best served by a 
critique of the literal meaning of images of a cruel and capricious deity hurling 
rocks at enemies or coming on the clouds to take over the world, luxuriating 
perhaps in images of a playful and loving God, jostling Jonah and forgiving 
the Ninevites. To demote scriptures from ultimate meaning means that scrip­
ture, confessed as revealed, remains human enunciation, moved and propelled 
by the spirit of God, but not a divine packet of sacred information. Thus it is 
true that “ (bjiblical revelation and salvation . . . dwell fully in the convention­
al realm,”  for that is where we live.
It is true that “ the dimension of ultimate meaning, in its otherness from this 
realm, hardly gets a look in”  (121), for there is nothing to look into at all. The 
truth of ultimate meaning is not a vantage nor a realm nor a register, not 
an “ in”  at which to look. Its silence is simply silent, entailing no further 
philosophical attachment. Therefore, there is no valid “ monolithic view of ul-
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timate meaning** (122) because it is not a view at all. Ultimate meaning does 
not entail a cross-culturally shared immediacy o f pure experience, but is the 
guardian against any view o f  or claim for such an experience. The emptiness 
o f ultimate meaning is a non-affirming negation o f the ultimate validity o f  any 
language, and at the same time a reclamation o f the logical, reasoned validity 
of conventional discourse.
It is true that there does function a myth o f ultimate meaning, as O’Leary 
is aware from the current brouhaha among Japanese Buddhologists over the 
issue of the myth o f Buddha-nature, of emptiness as the realm of pure non­
discrimination, o f ultimate meaning as the hidden deity behind phenomenal 
appearances—all versions o f dhtituvada, that is, any theory (yada) that 
grounds itself upon a realm (dhatu), however ineffable, however numinous. 
Buddhist thinkers are not immune from the tendency to reify even the doc­
trine o f emptiness, which is why Nagirjuna insists that one empty even empti­
ness, for this is not the final view, but the expcller o f all views. When I claim 
that ultimate truth is a matter of silence, the point is that our words about 
God must fall silent before the otherness o f God. Thus to assert that doctrinal 
statements are “ conventional, language-formed presentations o f that [silent] 
awareness” (125) is not to reduce theology to a science of “ the ‘as i f  or of 
‘supreme fictions’ ”  (125), but merely to affirm that it is human discourse.
Still, O’Leary is correct to espy a mythic structure in my presentation of the 
two truths. No matter how absent I make the presence o f  ultimate meaning, 
no matter how other, ultimate meaning remains absent to a conscious 
presence. I indeed do revere ultimate truth as that which is covered over by the 
conventional languages we employ, and as covered, so indicated. A Mahayana 
theology does witness to the presence o f God in God’s absence from all images 
and ideas, and that divine presence is embodied in the darkening of all know­
ing. The apophatic darkness too is a mythic image, training people not to 
expect clear concepts of God. Perhaps that is why I first was attracted to 
Buddhist teachings and philosophies—fellow-travelers all. Yet, those same 
apophatic teachings play parable to myths of conceptual presence: They emp­
ty the center and direct attention to the margins o f experience: God docs not 
appear in the strength o f the storm, but in a small, still voice of silence. Yet, 
that parabolic emptying of the centrality o f divine presence draws its validity 
only by negating myths o f centered presence. In the absence o f emptying para­
ble, any discourse on ultimate meaning, by the very force of its verbal enuncia­
tion, constructs a mythic presence o f ultimate meaning, an unseen but very 
real absence, marked by the unknowing that delimits its reality. (See Malcolm 
David Eckel, To See the Buddha.) And that centering myth o f a mystic unseen 
in its turn calls constantly for yet further emptyings, other parabolic decon-
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structions, in order to trace that which remains forever absent from any myth or 
any theology, much in the manner of Gregory of Nyssa, for whom the soul 
never comes to the term of its unending explorations into the depths of divini­
ty; not ever is it static, even in the beatific vision.
The “ objectivity’* of theological discourse is then a conventional objectivi­
ty. To claim that language is conventional, however, is not to negate all objec­
tivity. It is to negate any essential correspondence between language and reali­
ty. “ Religious statements are shots in the dark, but they can succeed in hitting 
their mark,’* (125) O ’Leary argues. And I concur, for among the basic mean­
ings for the Sanskrit word for “ meaning** (artha) in the truth of ultimate 
meaning (paramltrtha-satya) is that of “ aim, objective,”  from the root arth, 
“ to strive for, to ask, to entreat.”  One could as well translate the phrase as 
“ the truth of that which is ultimately (param a) aimed at (artha).99 Yet, I do 
not think one can judge the validity of such truth by purely intellectual 
means—for example, by the adequacy of the questions raised and answered. 
One knows that one has hit the mark only when it is effective in leading sen­
tient beings toward the practice of the path.
Comparative Perspectives
O ’Leary in his Religious Pluralism and Christian Truth has written persuasive­
ly about religious truth in an age that is very conscious of multiple perspec­
tives. With acumen he practices a careful and balanced comparative, intercul- 
tural theology. Indeed, we spent several pleasant afternoons at the Nanzan 
Institute for Religion and Culture arguing the issues, and I have profited much 
from his insightful critiques. But the task I envisage for myself is different 
from his task. He says that “ every single application of Buddhist categories to 
Christian discourse implies a ’fusion of horizons’ raising the most difficult her­
meneutical problems,”  (116) and warns about too facile comparisons and 
putative victories, one way or the other. No doubt comparative theology must 
come to terpis with the hermeneutics of cultural crossing-over. Yet Christian 
thought from early times has adopted and adapted philosophical approaches 
to the enunciation of its doctrine. The classical models are precisely that: the 
adoption and adaptation of Greek philosophy for the expression of the 
Gospel.
My endeavor is to think and write Christian theology from a Mahayana 
philosophical perspective. Cherishing classical Greek theology, I still refuse to 
privilege that theology as the only Christian philosophical approach (against 
Etienne Gilson, The Spirit o f  Medieval Philosophy, and his arguments for a 
specifically Christian philosophy). Furthermore, I urge that without the ac­
tual doing of a Mahayana theology, the hermeneutical problems about fusing
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horizons will never actually come into play at all, for hermeneutics is not a 
first, preparatory step toward theology, but a subsequent critique o f what in 
fact occurs in human thinking. Textbooks like to place a chapter on hermeneu­
tics at the beginning, as if  the author had first evolved clear notions of how to 
proceed before proceeding. In fact, hermeneutical issues come to light only in 
the practice of reading and thinking. One can elicit norms of interpretation 
only by actually interpreting and reflecting upon that activity, just as one can 
develop a method o f playing tennis only from actually playing tennis. To 
some poststructuralist philosophers, one should simply stop doing philosophy 
until all the proper hermeneutical concerns have been satisfied. Prasapgika- 
M&dhyamika philosophers, by contrast, argue that all philosophies raise more 
questions than they can ever answer, and that all viewpoints, even hermeneuti­
cal viewpoints, eventually implode under their own weight.
So then, I attempt no “ elaborate negotiation” (116) between Christianity 
and Buddhism. Rather, nurtured as a Christian since birth and immersed in 
Mahayana thought for some thirty years, 1 think about the Gospel from a 
Mahayana standpoint. This is within the revered tradition o f all theology, and 
I consider myself to be doing straightforward theology, not brokering dis­
parate discourses identified as Buddhist or Christian. I do not aim to identify 
parallels across traditions, as if I could know that “ the experience o f the 
world as it is, in its dependent co-arising, is identical with the discovery o f 
God as ‘Abba’ ” (117). I have no avenue to identify anyone’s experience ex­
cept, to some limited degree, my own. And I could scarcely claim that Bud­
dhist experiences o f awakening are the same as Christian experiences of resur­
rection. What possible evidence could I bring forward?
What I can and do claim is that I can gain fresh perspectives by contem­
plating my own Christian experience through the lens o f  Mahayana Buddhist 
philosophical categories. It is quite clear that Jesus was not a crypto-Buddhist 
and I certainly do not try to “ correlate Jesus with Zen” (122). Perish the 
thought! For many years now, I have been unable to identify Jesus very 
accurately at all. O’Leary thinks Jesus “ speaks more as a prophet than as a 
master o f spirituality,” and perhaps he is correct. But there are many different 
Jesuses, each constructed by some species of theological reflection. (A host o f 
scholars argue that Jesus’ teaching was first and foremost a wisdom teaching. 
See J. S. Kloppenborg, The Formation o f  Q: Trajectories in Ancient Wisdom, 
who argues that the earliest elements of the shared source—i.e., behind the 
shared passages in Matthew and Luke with Markan parallel—are wisdom 
sayings, with eschatological teachings added somewhat later. Also see B. 
Witherington, Jesus the Sage, and John D. Crossan, Jesus: A Revolutionary 
Biography.)
A Mahayana reading o f the Gospel is not an attempt to uncover the hidden
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meaning o f the Gospel, as i f  that had lain fallow until Mahayana came along 
to explain it. Rather, this is a constructive theological endeavor that attempts 
to coax new insights from  our collective memories and textual witnesses in ord­
er to  enliven the practice o f  the kingdom. I have no intention o f “ defin[ing] 
carefully the differences between the New Testament and Mahayana con­
texts,** nor o f “ stag[ing] . . .  an open confrontation between Buddhism and 
the Gospel’ ’ (128). I do not suppose that M ark is “ an anonymous Buddhist** 
(128). Never in life  should such a thought be thought! I t  is precisely because 
Mahayana maps such a different terrain and elicits such an alternate set o f 
questions that it  seems to  assuage my theological itch.
Which brings me to the point about the plausibility o f  Mahayana interpreta­
tions o f Mark.
Plausible Interpretations
O ’Leary scolds me fo r “ over-facile methods o f coping with the Christian 
past, . . . w ith pure escamotage [i.e., juggling], . . . [w ith] over-interpreta­
tion, tangential associations**—in a word to the failure to  ground scriptural in­
terpretations in “ a plausible construal o f  the text** (128). I  do admit that 1 try 
to coax the text toward what my Mahfiyflna lens brings into focus, fo r I  find 
many o f the accepted scriptural interpretations to be inane, self-serving, and 
implausible.
For instance, O ’Leary accuses me o f  wishful thinking in  refusing to  see a 
replacement theology in Mark 12:9. He claims that the passage (Now what w ill 
the owner o f the vineyard do? He w ill come and make an end o f  the tenants 
and give the vineyard to  others.) “ can have no other meaning** than a replace­
ment theology (128). Note carefully that he does not champion such a theolo­
gy. In  fact, he rejects it completely. Boldly he holds that some o f “ Jesus’ own 
world-view . . . can be revised in  the light o f Buddhist insights** (127). In ­
deed, history shows that we have frequently adjusted our theology by reject­
ing elements o f  views assumed or expressed in the biblical texts. We do not 
stone people caught in adulterous acts. We do not fo llow  Paul’s strictures on 
the relationship between husband and wife. We reject any sexism or hierarchi­
cal values expressed in the text, no matter how sacred the text may be. But I 
think O ’ Leary fails to  read carefully here. A  replacement theology is a self­
serving reading o f the story o f  the tenant landlord and, although this reading 
has become habitual by virtue o f frequent repetition, it is not inscribed in 
the text itself. There is no question that the passage is aimed at the temple au­
thorities, fo r it reiterates a frequent theme o f the Hebrew Bible (Isaiah 5:1-7, 
Hosea 10:1-2, Jeremiah 12:1-17). The point in M ark, as in Isaiah, is that the 
vineyard o f Israel is but leased to the religious authorities, here clearly the
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Jewish temple authorities. Mark’s Jesus indicts those authorities, with their ele­
vation of human customs to absolute religious status. Yet it is an implausible 
stretch to imagine that Mark himself is arguing for the superiority o f Christian­
ity over Judaism, as if a critique o f religious authorities entailed a rejection of 
the tradition they inauthentically represent. Does O’Leary really think Mark is 
treating the relative validity o f religious traditions? The question is how we are 
to regard the chief priests, scribes and elders (11:27), who question Jesus’ 
authority. Are they simply the representatives o f Jewish tradition? Or are they 
faulted precisely because they misuse their own authority? Is Jesus’ indictment 
a knock-down blow for Christian identity? Or, more simply, a rejection o f  the 
mutation o f the traditional authority they usurp? I suggest, plausibly, that 
Mark’s Jesus is rejecting such usurped authority, not the entire tradition of 
his ancestors. Indeed, in the remainder of chapter 12, Jesus engages in very 
traditional, friendly discourse with other scribes. What he rejects is frozen, 
hypocritical religion, i.e., “ the falsity o f clinging to any tradition, whether 
Jewish or Christian” (128). Jesus in Mark is not recommending a viewpoint 
called Christianity over another viewpoint called Judaism. Rather, he recom­
mends the following o f the path o f true practice, as described by the Shema 
(Deuteronomy 6:4-5, Leviticus 19:18, cited in Mark 12:28-34): love God and 
neighbor. It is totally implausible to read into the Markan passage later con­
cerns about the validity o f identifiable religions—indeed, the term religion 
never occurs in the Gospel o f Mark.
O’Leary also complains (128) about my interpretation o f the sea into which 
faith can throw the mountain o f the Temple, for 1 do contrast the mountain, 
identified by sound exegetes as the Temple mound, with fixed and deluded 
religiosity and am led thereby to understand the sea as the chaos that marks 
the absence o f any human constructs. I admit that here I do coax out Maha­
yana insights, but the rhetoric o f the passage invites us to do just that—it 
presents an obviously preposterous and impossible situation that begs for 
symbolic interpretation. No literalist has ever presented a plausible construal 
of this passage, precisely because no throwing o f any mountain into the sea 
has in fact been accomplished through the faith o f any saint, any pope, or cer­
tainly any theologian. The passage is symbolic in the extreme, and so I offer 
but one plausible symbolic reading.
O’Leary sees Jesus as an eschatological prophet and desires to maintain the 
historical impact o f New Testament eschatology. He writes: “Thus the break­
ing-open o f the dependently co-arisen world to ultimate divine reality which is 
effected in Christ is mediated by the eschatological aspect o f Christ’s exis­
tence, as always transcending itself toward the future o f the kingdom” 
(Religious Pluralism, 258). In order to emphasize the historical concreteness 
of that “ always transcending eschatology,” he must critique my notion that
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the kingdom announced by Jesus in 1:15 has no linear time referent, being at 
hand at each and every moment. I counter that the absence of a time referent 
hardly means that it * ‘ceases to be a concrete intervention within human histo­
ry and becomes instead a universal, ahistorical wisdom teaching." Rather, I ar­
gue that eschatology itself is myth, not a map of linear time. We already have 
our concrete and unavoidable history, which is quite capable of satisfying any 
demand for social embodiment. Precisely because Jesus collapses the mapped 
hopes of linear time, the kingdom is history-only, worldly convention-only, 
and not an imagined realm of God-Taking-Over on that final day. I do think 
Mark’s Jesus pushes eschatology beyond the negation of his present to the ne­
gation of any possible linear expectation, present or future. Wisdom, as in the 
passage O’Leary cites (117) transforms consciousness and "embodies the rule 
of compassion in the world of hard politics," hardly an ahistorical universal. 
Eschatology, too, is a myth to render bearable histories of oppression and 
hopelessness. Yet I think it chimerical to hope "to  retrieve the concrete histori­
cal meaning of the Gospel call," as if that history were happening today. Our 
histories are different and our tasks for constructing the kingdom of justice 
and peace must consequently differ. O’Leary reads the eschatological accounts 
in the New Testament not in terms of their final victory, for they always move 
forward in history. But he wants to maintain their mythic structure as a never- 
ending map of our present journey. However, that reading of the eschaton as 
the end-time when God rules, is itself a precarious juggling of the textual wit­
nesses. By contrast, I recommend taking the eschaton as the end of time itself.
Nostalgic Loss
Among theologians who have grown up within a classical culture there is in­
deed a sense of loss, for the abandonment of classical assumptions appears to 
rob us of previously assured truths. The problems that led to this undermining 
are not, I think, theological, but philosophical. Nietzsche perhaps is a plausi­
ble culprit; apparently he was the first to notice the cultural shift. That shift 
from classical values appears to demand that we be satisfied with the detritus 
of a once-glorious theological edifice. That is the edifice O’Leary envisages as 
tottering in flames (114). Yet this is not Christianity itself, but rather the theo­
logical constructs of our cherished past. There are still Christians aplenty in 
the world, and they seem to go to church with the same regularity (or lack 
thereof) as before. Theology, on the other hand, is in deep trouble, for its war­
rants of intellectual plausibility are not accepted, even by many of the very peo­
ple who continue to frequent church services. No wonder that among its prac­
titioners there are withdrawal symptoms. Things appear nebulous (114, 130) 
and therefore unreliable: nothing to rely upon! But how could the resurrection
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o f Jesus not be clouded (nebula) to our understanding? Indeed, how can one 
trust in the unsupported air o f a Mahayana emptiness? How can one abandon 
all attachments? These issues are not newly discovered; they are obstacles 
traditionally associated with the practice o f mystic prayer in the entire tradi­
tion o f mystic theologians, from Jesus through Gregory o f Nyssa and John o f 
the Cross to Thomas Merton and Thich Nhat Hanh.
Mahayana thinkers frequently describe their deepest insights by using the 
term “ only” (matra). They speak o f worldly convention only (saqivrti-matra), 
or conscious construction only (yijriapti-matra). Yet this “ only” is not meant 
to deprive anyone o f anything real at all. It signals not privation, but rediscov- 
ered fullness. It sloughs off misleading addictions and deluded ideas about 
what in fact is real, about our grasp o f  reality. To metaphysicians, however, 
this “ only” or “merely” signals privation, and triggers a metaphysical nostal­
gia. Who would not prefer to dwell in the solid, unmovable towers o f self- 
assured certainty?
Resist! The task o f modem theology is not to seek familiar comforts, but to 
develop the hybrid strength to abandon false supports and thrive in a world 
that is devoid o f privileged enclosures. O’Leary well knows this. That is, I 
think, why he lives in Japan.
Response to Robert F. Rhodes’ Review of
M adhyam aka Thought in China
Liu Ming-Wood
I have just come across Robert F. Rhodes’ review o f my book Madhyamaka 
Thought in China (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1994) in The Eastern Buddhist, vol. 30, 
no. 2 (1997). As I find most o f the criticisms which the review raises misdirect­
ed and groundless, I feel obliged to respond.
The objections which Rhodes raises fall into two categories, one concerning 
the structure o f  the book and the other concerning the historical information 
that the book provides. Regarding the structure o f the book, Rhodes com­
plains that “ each of the chapters is a self-contained unit,” that “ no attempt is 
made to relate the doctrines o f one school with those of the others,” that 
“also lacking is any attempt to discern how the different schools influenced 
each other” (p. 299). That Rhodes reads each chapter as “ a self-contained 
unit” is his choice, but that is not the way the book is intended to be read. The 
book comprises four chapters forming an organic whole, with Chapter One
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